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EU GLOBAL STRATEGY – AN 
UPGRADE OR NEW OS?




This article examines European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in regard to 
European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003. Its main focus is to answer the 
question: is the EUGS just the upgrade of the EES or is it a standalone docu-
ment. Although both documents are named strategies, it has been argued that 
the ESS doesn't meet the criteria to justify its title. Concentrating on a mode 
of discourse of the strategies, article looks at theirs similarities and differences, 
as well as examines how their structures fall within given definition for the 
strategy. This article argues that the ESS is a document in contradiction with 
its name, and that the European Union received its real security strategy just 
with the EUGS.
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1.	 Introduction
The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) was a long awaited docu-
ment in Brussels hallways, and not only among stakeholders of foreign 
and security affairs in the EU but beyond. EUGS comes as a first com-
Iva Žutić, Phd Candidate in Political Science (International Relations), Faculty of Political 
Science, University of Zagreb, ivazutic@yahoo.com
†Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović, Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of 
Zagreb
I. ŽutIć, †L. ČehuLIć VukadInoVIć: eu GLoBaL StRateGY – an uPGRade oR neW oS?
stručni rad  Primljen: 10. 1. 2017.
92 Europske studije – European Studies   2017  3  (5-6)  91-116
pact and unifying document when the EU needs unity and consolida-
tion after the vote for Brexit. EUGS is not unique document. It is just a 
sequel to an existing document – the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
from 2003. EUGS seems a long overdue sequel– but is it really?
This paper will analyse both documents concerned, and will try to 
answer the title question. Is the new document just one of many doc-
uments which the bureaucratic milieu of the Union produces in abun-
dance that shines brightly on the Brussels' sky for a fortnight before it 
disappears into the vastness of Schuman's drawers? Is it an upgrade of 
the ESS, a 2003 document that is awfully outdated in a changed glob-
al-security landscape? Or is it really a new EU 'operating system', as 
Brussels key actors assure us?
To answer these questions, this paper will compare the old docu-
ment, the ESS from 2003, and the new EUGS. It will analyse their struc-
tures and core ideas by placing both in their contextual surroundings.
2.	European	Security	Strategy	2003
The first step towards developing a unified EU security strategy came 
during the writing process of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, when, in 
the text about foreign policy instruments at the EU's disposal, the syn-
tagm "common strategies" was first introduced (Missirolli, 2015:9). The 
Amsterdam Treaty came into force in May 1999, and rapidly thereafter 
three EU "common strategies" on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterra-
nean were realised. In a series of public speeches in 2000, the European 
Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, said: "Foreign pol-
icy remains primly a matter for democratically elected Member State 
governments… But it is equally necessary that all Member States should 
acknowledge what those actually doing the work of CFSP have long un-
derstood: that mere inter-governmentalism is recipe for weakness and 
mediocrity: for a European foreign policy of the lowest common de-
nominator" (Missirolli, 2001:43). In the same speech, the Commission-
er stated how EU foreign policy must have a global reach, but should 
focus its efforts. He offered three overall goals:
•	 	"to manage more effectively our relationships with our nearest 
neighbors
• to apply our experience of multilateral cooperation to a wider stage
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• to become a serious counterpart to the United States" (Missirolli, 
2001:44)
After Patten's repeated interventions in 2000, discussion evolved on 
both institutional and political levels, and culminated with the EU Coun-
cil stressing "the importance of common strategies for the coordination, 
coherence and effectiveness of external action" (Europa.eu, accessed on 
29.8.2016). The Council called on newly appointed High Representa-
tive (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier 
Solana, to write an evaluation report on the adopted common strate-
gies. In an Evaluation Report published on the 21st December 2000, the 
HR noted how "common strategies" didn't bring any added value to EU 
policy, how the strategies lacked any formalised guidelines, how proce-
dures were improvised and ended with no clear priorities, and how the 
strategies were closer to classical declaratory texts than to useful inter-
nally-applicable modes of operation (Missirolli, 2015:10). Despite lively 
discussion, researchers agree that only after Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
2003 came any active input towards writing a comprehensive Europe-
an strategy (Toje, 2005; Becher, 2004; Duke, 2004; Missiroli, 2015). The 
need emerged from the rift between the EU Member States (MS) and 
candidate countries over the support for US policy towards Iraq. The 
ESS, therefore, got its tail wind not from the constant calls for the re-
form of the ESDP policy, but by the external influence of US foreign pol-
icy, which caused discord among European countries (Toje, 2004:120). 
After several months of consultations with all relevant stakeholders, and 
after gathering contributions from the Member States (although Anto-
nio Missiroli notes how "the pen was kept firmly in the hands of Solana's 
own cabinet" (Missirolli, 2015:14)) the European Council adopted the 
European Security Strategy of the European Union ("A secure Europe in 
a Better World") on the 12th December 2003.
Looking solely at the layout of content, the Strategy document was 
a short text of 14 pages with a clear framework, which consisted of the 
following headers:
• Introduction,
• Security environment: global challenges and key threats,
• Strategic objectives,
• Policy implications for Europe, and
• Conclusions.
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Introduction began with a note on how "Europe has never been so 
prosperous, so secure nor so free" (ESS, 2003:1) in opposition to its vi-
olent past in the first half of the 20th century. It notes Member States' 
commitment to the peaceful solution of conflicts, and to cooperation. It 
praises the rule of law and democracy as instruments of change, moving 
authoritarian regimes to stable democracies; and it states how the policy 
of enlargement fulfils the vision of a continent united. It observes how, 
although the United States played important role in European integra-
tion and security through NATO and as dominant military actor after 
the end of Cold War, the international security landscape has changed, 
and is more complex. With the change in security landscape came a 
change in the nature of the threats against the security of the EU. As a 
union of 25 states with over 450 million people, and as foremost lead-
er in the world economy, the EU is a global actor and, as such, needs 
"to share the responsibilities for global security and in building a better 
world" (ESS, 2003:1).
The second part of the Strategy is a short and concise, if not general-
ised, analysis of global changes, and lists key threats. The Strategy cites 
globalisation as the first global change, and states that it is perceived as a 
good and bad change depending on the part of the world. Globalisation 
opened the doors to non-state groups, which became a constant fixture 
of the "international infrastructure" (ESS, 2003:2). After globalisation, 
the Strategy notes that poverty and diseases in developing countries am-
plify security issues, and how any new disease can spread quickly and 
can become global threat. It continues by stating that "security is a pre-
condition of development" (ESS, 2003:2). As a future problem, it cor-
rectly notes that changes in global warming will add to competition for 
natural resources, highlighting the problem of scarcity of water in some 
parts of the world, and the likelihood of future great migrations (ESS, 
2003:3). As a special problem for Europe, the document highlights ener-
gy dependence (ESS, 2003:3). The Strategy notes five key threats for the 
EU, following a first sentence which explains that "large-scale aggression 
against any Member States is now improbable" (ESS, 2003:3). Terror-
ism is the first listed threat. Its motive is noted as "religious extremism", 
stemmed from: "pressure of modernisation, cultural, social and polit-
ical crisis, and the alienation of the young people living in foreign so-
cieties" (ESS, 2003:3). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) is named as "potentially the greatest threat to our society" (ESS, 
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2003:3). The paper warns about the possibilities of a WMD arms race, 
and of the spread of biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. It 
also expresses concerns about the development of missile technology 
occurring alongside advancements in science. It warns and about the 
grave potential implicit in the possible co-mingling of terrorism and 
the proliferation of the WMD. The third key threat is regional conflicts, 
which can impact the EU directly or indirectly, as they lead to "extrem-
ism, terrorism, and state failure" (ESS, 2003:4). The fourth key threat is 
state failure, which is characterised as "an alarming phenomenon that 
undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability" (ESS, 
2003:4), while the fifth is given as organised crime (cross-border traffick-
ing in drugs, women, illegal migrants, and weapons), for which Europe 
is the main target.
Third part of the Strategy indicates three strategic objectives, which 
the EU should endeavour to achieve while keeping the maxim "to think 
globally and act locally" in mind:
• Addressing the Threats,
• Building Security in our Neighborhood, and
• An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism.
Concerning the first strategic objective, the ESS states that the EU 
has been active in addressing the threats, listing measures used as: the 
adoption of the European Arrest warrant, the tackling of terrorist fi-
nancing, the signing of the agreement on mutual legal assistance with 
the US, the exertion of policies against the proliferation of WMDs, the 
strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the tighten-
ing of export controls, the attainment of a universal commitment to-
wards and strengthening of multilateral treaties, the supportive inter-
vention into regional conflicts and the restoration of good government 
in failed countries (ESS, 2003:6). Continuing, it states that in the era of 
globalisation there are no distant threats, and that all key threats should 
be tackled through conflict-prevention before crisis occurs. The docu-
ment notes how the new threats with which EU is confronted are hybrid 
threats, and as such require hybrid responses involving a "mixture of in-
struments" (ESS, 2003:7). Listed instruments are: political, economical, 
intelligence, police, judicial, military, humanitarian, and 'other'. The sec-
ond strategic objective confirms that "even in an era of globalisation, ge-
ography is still important" (ESS, 2003:7). An insecure neighbourhood, 
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it establishes, can produce new threats. Thus, the EU needs to advance 
towards establishing an integration of states in processes of accession, as 
well as promoting good governance and offering political cooperation 
in neighbouring states. The third strategic objective, the development 
of a stronger international order based on effective multilateralism, 
is a direct answer to problems and threats which arise from globalisa-
tion. This objective should be based on upholding and developing Inter-
national Law as set out under the United Nations Charter. It should aim 
to strengthen the United Nations, and extend membership of the WTO 
and other international financial institutions. Under this objective falls 
the strengthening of transatlantic relations, putting forward NATO as 
successful example. It also emphasises increased international invest-
ment in regional organisations close to the EU, such as OSCE and the 
Council of Europe, as well as in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African 
Union. As "the best protection for our security is a world of well-gov-
erned democratic states" (ESS, 2003:10), the EU should aim to spread 
the understanding of the processes of good governance and social and 
political reforms, to establish the rule of law and protect of human 
rights, and to fight against corruption and the abuse of power. These 
goals should be achieved by trade and development policies, especially 
through assistance programmes and targeted trade measures.
The last part of the Strategy is made up of general recommendations 
given under the header of policy implications for Europe. It states that 
EU already has instruments in place for the achievement of proposed 
strategic objectives and for combating key threats, but to "make a con-
tribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more 
coherent and more capable" (ESS, 2003:11). Union should be more ac-
tive by employing active policies, and developing a strategic culture for 
fostering "early, rapid, and when necessary, robust interventions" (ESS, 
2003:11). The document states that the EU should be able to maintain 
a number of simultaneous operations, involving both civilian and mili-
tary capabilities. It should, we are told, be able to support the UN during 
its response to threats to international society, as well as in providing 
assistance to states in which there is emerging conflict. Preventive en-
gagement should be one of the aims to ensure the avoidance of problems 
in the future. In its second point, the Strategy emphasises that a more 
capable EU is within reach, as is showed by the establishment of the Eu-
ropean Defence Agency (EDA). The EU should, however, transform its 
I. ŽutIć, †L. ČehuLIć VukadInoVIć: eu GLoBaL StRateGY – an uPGRade oR neW oS?
stručni rad  Primljen: 10. 1. 2017.
Europske studije – European Studies   2017  3  (35-6)  91-116 97
militaries to enable more flexibility in addressing the new threats, with 
more resources given over to defence. It should also reduce duplication, 
and increase capabilities in defence policy with use of pooling and shar-
ing. It might devote special attention to post crisis management, and 
work on the strengthening of diplomatic capabilities through employing 
a combination of MS and EU institutional resources. Common actions 
should commence after a common threat assessment, which calls for 
better sharing of intelligence data among MS and partners, and should 
be extended with joint disarmament operations, support for third coun-
tries in combating terrorism, security sector reform, and broader in-
stitution-building. The paper stresses that EU-NATO arraignments en-
hance the operational capabilities of the EU. Bringing together different, 
pre-established instruments and capabilities through common policies, 
better coordination, and through external activities, is the way to make 
the EU more coherent: "in crisis there is no substitute for unity of com-
mand" (ESS, 2003:13). As a last recommendation, the Strategy states 
that working with partners, which includes establishing partnerships 
with key actors and multilateral co-operation in international organi-
sations, is a necessity, since all threats described are common threats. 
Specifically, it states that although the EU has links to every part of the 
world, partnership with the USA is indispensable, closer relations with 
Russia through respect for common values are necessary, and the devel-
opment of strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India 
are needed.
In conclusions, Strategy notes that the world is full of new dangers 
but and new opportunities, and, if more active and capable, the EU 
would make an impact on a global scale, and "contribute to an effec-
tive multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world" 
(ESS, 2003:14).
In the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) publication "Towards an 
EU Global Strategy" from 2015, writers compared draft texts of the first 
strategy from June 2003 and its end result from December 2003, stat-
ing how, after discussions with stakeholders, the end text of ESS made 
a few distinct changes. While in the draft text only three key threats 
were recognised (there called "new threats"), the final Strategy included 
the identification of five key threats. The final Strategy also put stronger 
emphasis on effective multilateralism as a foreign policy in opposition 
to US' unilateralism, and made an important linguistic change, alter-
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ing the call for "pre-emptive engagement" in the draft text to a call for 
"preventive engagement" in the final (Missirolli, 2015:15). Discussions 
leading to the final compromise resulted in a weakened document. A 
number of papers rightly pointed out that the European Security Strat-
egy from December of 2003 was not a real strategy (Toje, 2004; Posen, 
2004). Toje argues that it does in fact fulfil all criteria necessary for it to 
be called a strategic concept, that is "a guide to be used while perusing an 
agenda" (Toje, 2004:120), as it shows purpose and tasks, identifies a se-
curity landscape, and describes the EU's approaches towards the desira-
ble security outcome (Toje, 2004:120). But, he continues, "traditionally, 
the term 'strategy' refers to the use of military means to reach political 
ends" (Toje, 2004:120) and "defines actual goals and set up priorities to 
achieve policy objectives" (Toje, 2004:121), which the ESS doesn't. What 
the ESS is, at least according to Toje, is a "testimony of the need to de-
velop an EU strategic culture" (Toje, 2004:122), a culture that will have 
agreed aims. Following same line of thought, Becher notes that the ESS 
serves important functions: it is educational for the public, attempts to 
explain world events, offers stimulation for public debates and guidance 
for the EU officials, and provides encouragement for the future (Becher, 
2004:354).
The main problem of the institutionalisation, or the 'culturization', 
of the EU security policy is the difference in the security views of the 
Member States. Ideally, then, the ESS 2003 was an instrument for es-
tablishing EU strategic culture – as it is, however, it shows desire but 
delivers nothing. Ultimately, through the ESS we received a backpack 
packed with supplies and could begin to understand the inclination for 
beginning the journey ahead, but we were left short of an agreed-upon 
path, and a detailed map.
To keep the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) afloat, 
in 2008 the European Council produced the 'Report on the Implemen-
tation of the European Security Strategy' (RI-ESS), named "Providing 
Security in a Changing World". At the outset, the new document was 
meant to be an updated version of the ESS, but the idea fell through 
as Britain and Germany opposed any new strategy (Toje, 2010:174). It 
therefore became an implementation report, although Toje notes that 
it "does not evaluate the progress made[...], it does not offer concrete 
recommendations for the future, nor is any follow-up mechanism pro-
vided" (Toje, 2010:175-176).
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Challenges and key threats, we come to understand, remain more 
or less the same: "some have become more significant, and all more 
complex" (Missiroli, 2015:45). Of the five key threats from the ESS, the 
Review re-affirms the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD, and 
merges terrorism and organised crime in a connected threat. It replaces 
threats posed by failed states and regional conflicts with those offered 
by cyber, energy security, and climate change. It also concurs with the 
ESS in finding the main means for upholding security as multilateral-
ism under UN authority, together with friends and allies. Unlike the 
ESS, which tried to position the EU as a more powerful actor which will 
provide a soft balance against the US, the Review abandons that aim. As 
Toje notes, the Review can be understood as the EU hedging its bets; it 
"seeks to offset risk by pursuing multiple policy options that increase 
the likelihood of a beneficial result from a range of different outcomes" 
(Toje, 2010:185). In its third part, Europe in changing World, the Re-
view gives its most important recommendations. These recommenda-
tions were not as prominent in the ESS, and are: to tighten coordination 
inside EU; to do a "comprehensive EU policy on information sharing" 
(Missiroli, 2015:46); to work against terrorist financing; and to do more 
to counter radicalisation and recruitment. The only really new concept 
introduced in the Review is the idea of 'human security', which argues 
that the referent for security should be the wellbeing of the individual 
but of the state (Toje, 2010:180).
3. Change	of	global	security	landscape	2003	–	2016
There is a vast difference between the state of affairs and global security 
landscape from the end of 2003, when the ESS was published, and the 
middle of 2016, when the EUGS came to light.
The EU is now the Union of 28 states, pending 27 after the UK's ref-
erendum on leaving the EU. The EU contains 50 million more people, 
and is economically more efficient than ever. It is also a remodelled Un-
ion after the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, which amended the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union. The Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, and is very impor-
tant for the CSDP and our analysis of the difference between the ESS 
and the EUGS. The Lisbon Treaty introduced important defence-relat-
ed changes, almost all recommended in the ESS and the RI-ESS. These 
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include the permanent structured cooperation mechanism (PESCO) 
in Art 42(6) and 46 TEU; the mutual assistance/defence clause in Art 
42(7) TEU; the solidarity clause in Art 222 TFEU; the enhanced co-
operation in Art 20 TEU; and the expansion of the Petersburg tasks 
in Art 43 TEU. Up to the writing of this paper, the sole CSDP instru-
ment introduced in the Lisbon Treaty which has been used is the de-
fence clause, which stipulates that "if a Member State is the victim of 
armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have 
towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter" 
(Treaty of Lisbon, 2007:326/39). This was invoked in November 2015 by 
France. The PESCO mechanism, aimed towards "Those Member States 
whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made 
more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to 
the most demanding missions" (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007:326/39), should 
be next introduced if we hold onto the German/French pledge given 
this summer. The enhanced cooperation mechanism is a mechanism of 
last resort, which could be put in action only when a desirable objec-
tive cannot be reached by the whole Union in the field of the Union's 
non-exclusive competence, while the solidarity clause is the instrument 
of joint-action if one Member State is the object of terrorist attack, or 
natural or man-made disaster. The Lisbon Treaty also extends the scope 
and range of the Petersburg tasks to include "joint disarmament oper-
ations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance 
tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forc-
es in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict sta-
bilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, 
including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their 
territories" (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007:306/35). This is a clear response to 
the recommendation of a more capable Europe in the ESS. The trea-
ty was a cornerstone for the creation of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy, who, from the Lisbon Trea-
ty onwards, became Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/
VP). It also gave new impetus to the EDA, and a project of Battlegroups 
that reached full operational capacity on the 1st January 2007. In be-
tween 2003 and 2016, the EU gave life to a bundle of new policies in 
the foreign policy and security fields, the most important of which were 
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the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP), Eastern Partnership (EaP), 
and the Union for the Mediterranean (renewed Barcelona process). It 
created the European Security and Defence College, and set new targets 
for further development of EU civilian and military capability under 
"Headline Goal 2010".
Not all changes went in the direction of progress. The EU and its 
Member States are still alert after the financial crisis of 2008, which had 
direct consequences for defence budgets. Moreover, money intended for 
the investment in further development of the EU's military capabilities 
had to be diverted elsewhere. The most significant and visible example 
is the non-fulfilment of four collective benchmarks for investment, as 
approved by the Ministerial Steering Board of EDA in November 2007. 
It wasn't merely that the benchmarks – on equipment procurement, 
including R&D/R&T, (20% of total defence spending), European col-
laborative equipment procurement (35% of total equipment spending), 
defence Research & Technology (2% of total defence spending) and Eu-
ropean collaborative defence R&T (20% of total defence R&T spending) 
– were not met, but investment actually decreased (EDA,2016).
While the EU slowly constructed and interconnected its internal in-
stitutions, capacities, and capabilities (with greater or lesser success), 
the world changed. The security landscape of 2016 is more turbulent 
and insecure for the EU than it was in 2003. Most of the conflicts and 
wars raging in 2003 are still being fought in some turbulent areas of the 
world, or else have been replaced by new ones in the same or a near 
locality. Although these conflicts do infringe on the EU's sense of se-
curity, real risks come from the new conflicts that emerged on the EU's 
borders (the aftermath of the Arab Spring; those in Ukraine and Tur-
key). Other new factors which should worry the EU are the rise of the 
new powers around the world, climate change, and the increasing lack 
of resources which slowly but steadily becomes the number one peril of 
the 21st century. Both the ESS and the RI-ESS correctly identified great 
future problems for international society: the merging of terrorism and 
organised crime, the proliferation of WMD, increasing global warm-
ing, threats posed by energy and cyber security, and increasing com-
petition for resources. At the centre of all these negative global changes 
was globalisation. One of the great examples of how globalisation affects 
the whole world was the financial crisis of 2008. While the crisis had a 
negative impact on the Western markets and especially on states with 
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fragile political systems, it was a wind in the sails for some "emerging" 
and "developing" economies. Accordingly, after 2008, EU countries saw 
a period of relative political and financial decline, while strong develop-
ing countries progressed. This reshaped the world's security landscape. 
In the same way that globalisation influences the world and security 
landscape negatively, it can and has influenced at them positively. Glo-
balisation facilitates the sharing and using of technological and scien-
tific advances, an increased understanding of ideas and lifestyles, the 
fostering of global growth and wealth, and, as a result, prolongs and 
improves the quality of human life around the world.
If the EU wants to use the positive aspects of globalisation for nor-
mative multilateralism, it must protect itself from globalisation's nega-
tive aspects. In 2015 all EU Member States finally agreed "that the secu-
rity environment had so radically changed – and not for the better – that 
a strategic rethinking had become imperative" (Tocci, 2015:120).
4. European	Union	Global	Strategy
The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), presented on the 28th of 
June 2016, has 56 pages and is comprised of:
• Executive Summary
• A Global Strategy to Promote our Citizens' Interests
• The Principles Guiding our External Action
• The Priorities of our External Action
• From Vision to Action
"We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is 
what the wider world expects." (EUGS, 2016:7). These are the opening 
words of the EUGS, and are followed by an injunction to remember 
that: "We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the Euro-
pean Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project which 
has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy is being 
questioned." (EUGS, 2016:7).
If one judges a book by its cover, or in this case by its opening re-
marks, one could feel that the EUGS is a more urgent appeal, with its 
main task to alarm and compel targets to act, as opposed to straight-
forwardly offering plain strategy on security, as in the ESS. The EGSS 
resumes its dire premonition when depicting the current security situa-
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tion around the EU. It notes that the EU's security in the East "has been 
violated" (EUGS, 2016:7). "Terrorism and violence plague" the South 
we are told, and are spreading across the Mediterranean and the Mid-
dle East (EUGS, 2016:7). Development in Africa is slow, unlike growth 
of its population, and "security tensions in Asia are mounting" (EUGS, 
2016:7). Above all, we're warned, climate change is advancing. The re-
port does spend two sentences describing how those changes could 
be opportunities, and acknowledges the good that was brought to the 
world through globalisation. It ends the short introduction to the Exec-
utive Summary with determined declarations to overcome troubles "by 
our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values 
enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and his-
toric achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, 
playing its collective role in the world." (EUGS, 2016:7). Our Shared In-
terests and Principles outlines established EU mantras: the promotion 
of peace and rules-based international order; guaranteeing the security 
and prosperity of its citizens and territory; adhering to its values and 
principles as guided by responsibility; the need to stand united and the 
desire to engage with others. The Priorities of our External Action sum-
marises five priorities: the security of the Union; offering state and soci-
etal resilience from East to South; maintaining an integrated approach 
to conflicts; instituting regional cooperation; and encouraging good 
global governance. Lastly, From Vision to Action sketches how the EU 
will exert its priorities to achieve its goals, and thereby become "a credi-
ble, responsive and joined-up Union" (EGSS, 2016:10).
In opposition to the ESS, the EUGS chooses a different way of pre-
senting the Strategy. It does not lay out global challenges and key threats, 
but reveals common interests, principles, and priorities for the achieve-
ment of its objectives. In other words, the EGSS speaks from inside out 
– what the EU wants, needs, and can do to achieve goals – while the ESS 
observed from outside in – what are the threats and problems surround-
ing the EU, and how should the EU position itself towards them? So 
here we should once again quote Toje's definition of strategy: "a strategy 
paper is expected to define actual goals and set up priorities to achieve 
policy objectives" (Toje, 2004:121), and: "a strategic concept is a guide 
to be used while pursuing an agenda. It expresses its purpose, nature, 
and the fundamental security tasks of the organisation. It also identi-
fies the central features of the security environment while specifying the 
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elements of the organisation's approach to security" (Toje, 2004:120). 
Just by outlining the document's construction, it becomes evident that 
the EUGS is in fact everything the ESS longed to be, but never was. In 
the light of the EUGS, we can argue that the ESS was in fact a draft of 
aspiration that indicated a need for EU strategy, while the EUGS is the 
strategy itself.
To demonstrate that the EUGS is in fact long awaited EU's strategy, 
we will follow Toje's definition and analyse the document by its seg-
ments.
The purpose of the EU's security tasks is "to Promote our Citizens' 
Interests" (EUGS, 2016:13) through promoting its values. These values, 
it explains, are "embedded in our interests. Peace and security, prosper-
ity, democracy and a rules-based global order" (EUGS, 2016:13). Peace 
and security, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based global order are 
all elements of the EU's approach to security, and they identify the cen-
tral features of the security environment as it stands. To promote peace 
and security, the EU needs to collaborate with partners, have capabilities 
to defend itself, hold onto its Treaties' commitments and acknowledge 
that "internal and external security are ever more intertwined" (EUGS, 
2016:14). This latter quote implies that the promotion of peace and se-
curity outside the EU's borders can lead to maintaining peace and secu-
rity inside the EU. The prosperity of EU citizens is a goal as important as 
ensuring prosperity is shared worldwide. The document notes that the 
EU needs to follow growth, the bulk of which will happen outside the 
EU, as the Union has strong interest in "fair and open markets, in shap-
ing global economic and environment rules, and in sustainable access 
to the global commons through open sea, land, air and space routes" 
(EUGS, 2016:15), as well as establishing free and secure internet. De-
mocracy needs to be fostered, with the values upon which it was built 
cherished, heeded, and promoted with each internal and external ac-
tion, without exception. To maintain peace and security, prosperity and 
democracy, a rules-based global order is of particular interest to the EU, 
"with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its 
core" (EUGS, 2016:15).
Central features of the proposed security environment, which are 
identified throughout this segment of the document, are: rapid glo-
balisation that blurs borders, maintaining free access to markets and 
commons, the promotion of the EU's values and democracies, and 
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adherence to a rules-based order. During the migration crisis in 2015 
and 2016, the Member States felt on their own skin how closely inter-
connected is the Union's security with their own policies in the Middle 
East, the North Africa and the Western Balkans. Prosperity should be 
observed and through the prism of social inequality that is growing in 
today's world, both inside and outside the European Union. A social 
inequality is especially visible between the metropolitan regions and 
the periphery of the Member States. With a wave of populist support in 
the Member States, it is precisely a democracy that is being threatened 
in the EU. The populist parties (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance in 
Hungary and Law and Justice Party in Poland) who came to the power 
by means of democracy, detect that same democracy and its values as 
a main obstacle for the reforms they want to pursue in their countries.
The Principles guiding the EU's external actions are de facto nature 
and fundamentals of security tasks. As a user-friendly and earnest doc-
ument, the EUGS acknowledges how its principles emerge from realis-
tic observation and idealistic ambitions, but notes that the EU's actions 
should be guided by principled pragmatism. The principle of unity is not 
just propellant, throwaway premise, but one that needs to be defended; 
when united in diversity the EU is more powerful and able to promote 
its citizens interests. The principle of engagement brings opportunities 
and impediments equally, as "environment degradation and resource 
scarcity knows no borders, neither do transnational crime and terror-
ism" (EUGS, 2016:17). To deal with "causes of conflicts and poverty, and 
to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights" (EUGS, 
2016:18), the EU will heed to its principle of responsibility and princi-
ple of partnership, as "responsibilities must be shared" (EUGS, 2016:18) 
with international organisations, regional bodies, states, civil society, 
and the private sector.
It is noteworthy to remark that these principles are not of the same 
value. The principle of unity, listed first in the EUGS is the umbrella 
principle, as the EU cannot utilise the three other principles without 
unity. The Member States are not equal in their economic, military, and 
even democratic strength. Only united, acting as one, can they mean-
ingfully utilise the principle of engagement, just as it is the EU as whole 
that needs to bare a responsibility and promote partnerships.
Substantial security strategy needs to define actual goals and set up 
priorities; the third part of the document goes about doing this, indi-
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cating five priorities that the EU's external action will pursue. The se-
curity of the Union is the first priority, as "the EU Global Strategy starts 
at home" (EUGS, 2016:18). Threats that imperil security of the EU are 
terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility, energy 
insecurity, the politics of fear, and the EU will engage them through five 
lines of action: security and defence, counter-terrorism, cyber security, 
energy security, and strategic communications. State and societal resil-
ience to East and South is second priority. If 'multilateralism' was main 
buzzword in the ESS, 'resilience' is the one for the EUGS: "A resilient 
state is a secure state" (EUGS, 2016:23). By building resilience, the EU 
plans to strengthen weak states and avoid state failure, but as "resilience 
is broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole soci-
ety" (EUGS, 2016:24), the true goal will be to build a resilient society. 
Instruments with which the EU will construct a resilient societies are 
enlargement policy, more effective migration policy, association agree-
ments, the deepening of partnerships, the creation of economic area, 
the building of physical and digital connections, the strengthening of 
societal links, and "work through development, diplomacy and CSDP" 
(EUGS, 2016:26). While building and strengthening the resilience of so-
ciety is long-term pre-emptive method for forestalling state failure, their 
integrated approach to conflicts and crisis is an ad hoc measure. This pri-
ority includes pre-emptive peace, which is to be implemented by mon-
itoring root causes of crisis; providing security and stabilisation when 
crisis erupts; conflict settlement; and promoting an 'political economy 
of peace', which means to "foster the space in which the legitimate econ-
omy can take root and consolidate" (EUGS, 2016:31). The fourth prior-
ity is cooperative regional order, which seems to imply discussion of the 
current European security order: "the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of boarders and the peace-
ful settlement of disputes" (EUGS, 2016:33). The document promotes 
the idea of closer trans-Atlantic relationships, a connected Asia and 
co-operation in the Arctic, and a peaceful and prosperous Mediterra-
nean, Middle East and Africa. The document raises concerns about spe-
cific European interests like the "climate, the Arctic, maritime security, 
education, research and cross-border cooperation" (EUGS, 2016:33). As 
it was mentioned in the beginning of the EUGS, it is a document which 
lists and realistic and idealistic goals. At present uncertain global secu-
rity situation, the picture of a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, 
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Middle East and Africa is not very realistic. It is an idealistic goal to 
which the EU should aspire. The idea of a closer trans-Atlantic relation-
ship was a realistic goal at the time when the EUGS was written, but 
today it feels closer to idealism with the Donald Trump in the office of 
President of the United States of America.
Global governance for the 21st century is the fifth priority, with "a 
strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order" (EUGS, 
2016:39). This will be achieved by reforming and increasing investment 
in the UN, the Security Council and the international financial insti-
tutions. Also, "the EU will lead by example by implementing its com-
mitments on sustainable development and climate change" (EUGS, 
2016:40) by seeking for the clarification and extension of the rules of 
the global trade and investment area; by aiming for widening the reach 
of international norms, regimes, and institutions; and by bidding for the 
development of new rules in cyber, space, energy and health policies 
and in new scientific fields. To do all of the above, the EU will work 
in partnership with other non-EU countries, organisations, the private 
sector, and with civil society.
The EUGS concludes with From Vision to Action, calling for a cred-
ible, responsive, and joined-up union. A more responsive union would 
be one in position to act rapidly and flexibly as a credible union. This 
may mean developing something more than soft-power capabilities by 
engaging all of its political, economic and military capacities joined-up 
across internal and external policies. In the end, the EUGS states how it 
is just the beginning, a vision, and that real work starts after the Strategy 
is translated into action.
5.	Analysis	of	strategies
As this paper has already observed, there were many possible causes for 
the writing of the ESS, but perhaps the primary trigger for doing so was 
the embittered division that occurred in light of the Iraq war in 2003. 
Nathalie Tocci poetically notes that then-HR Javier Solana "sought to 
heal the internal European wounds" (Tocci, 2015:116) – the aim of the 
2003 Strategy was, in the first place, internal. As was shown in the pre-
vious section, the state of affairs in the global security landscape chan-
ged immensely from 2003 to the present. During that time, there were 
myriad reasons to call for a new Strategy, and as many triggers. Notable 
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numbers of EU Member States lobbied for it, but still no significant pro-
gress was made before 2014. Tocci notes that Catharine Ashton, at one 
point HR and after the Lisbon Treaty HR/VP, wasn't keen to ask for the 
mandate for the new Strategy, but, after the European elections in 2014, 
newly-elected EU leadership (headed by Jean-Claude Juncker) was (To-
cci, 2015:116). HR/VP Federica Mogherini released the new Strategy on 
the 28th of June 2016.
Unlike the ESS, a document published with the intention to bind the 
EU Member States after another fiasco in the field of CFSP, the EUGS 
acts like a warning. Where the ESS opens with reminders about the pris-
tine idea behind EU project ("The violence of the first half of the 20th 
Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedent-
ed un European history" (ESS, 2003:1)), and reminds Member States 
and citizens alike about all good the EU and CFSP have done ("Europe 
has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free" (ESS, 2003:1)), the 
EUGS warns Member States about the insecurity of and dangers to-
wards the EU: "We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond 
the European Union." (EUGS, 2016:7). It impels them to act before it 
is too late: "We need a stronger Europe" (EUGS, 2016:1). Whereas the 
ESS starts with awe-inspiring words about the proficient and salutary 
changes the EU has made in and for Europe, compelling joyous and 
grateful emotions, the EUGS turns the tide by vocalising admonitions: 
"Our Union is under threat" (EUGS, 2016:7); and appeals for exigency 
in response: "Our European project which has brought unprecedented 
peace, prosperity and democracy is being questioned" (EUGS, 2016:7). 
The ESS progresses with description of threats and insecurity, and the 
EUGS resumes with a short reminder about progress made and oppor-
tunities ahead.
If 'multilateralism' was main buzzword in the ESS, 'resilience' is the 
one for the EUGS. The theme that divides the two mantras is the way in 
which the EU exercises its strategy. While multilateralism is a method 
describing how the EU wants to conduct its foreign and security policy 
– a desirable path, an aspiration, which depends on other partakers – re-
silience is pragmatic goal that depends on pre-existing EU instruments. 
Both documents state that the EU needs to take responsibility for the 
international security landscape, but while the ESS states modus oper-
andi, how to do something, the EUGS reveals an end goal, and describes 
the methods of implementing the instruments to achieve it.
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Asle Toje's main objection toward the ESS was that it didn't offer 
"even roughest guide to the sort of situations in which coercive mili-
tary and economic power might be used" (Toje, 2010:178). The EUGS 
does nothing but indicate this in its constant references to promotion 
and building of resilience, and by presenting its 'integrated approach to 
conflicts and crisis' that will be multi-dimensional, multi-phased, mul-
ti-level and multi-lateral. The EU, we're informed, was taught from ex-
perience that these conflicts have a 'protracted nature' (EUGS, 2016:28) 
– these, then, will be the most cogent responses. The EUGS has, in a 
way, an easier job in this segment, since the EU has already showed the 
significant way it can exercise its economic power in the case of Iran and 
in the on-going case in Russia.
Four core terms Toje extracted from the ESS were 'strategic culture', 
'effective multilateralism', 'failed states', and 'preventive engagement'. 
(Toje, 2003:121). The EUGS never mentions any of the ESS' core terms, 
preferring to replace them with its own. 'Preventive engagement is re-
placed by 'building resilience in the EU' (and, perhaps most notably, also 
outside of the EU), while 'effective multilateralism' is replaced by 'rules-
based global order', with the future goal of global governance under the 
UN. Other core terms in the EUGS are 'shared interests' that supplant 
'strategic objectives', 'principled pragmatism' that substitutes 'strategic 
culture', and its commitment towards 'regional politics' as a strategic 
priority. According to Biscop, by sticking to principled pragmatism – 
emphasising "own security, the neighbourhood, and hard power, and 
by no longer emphasising democratisation" – the politics of the EU is 
slowly but steadily going back to Realpolitik (Biscop, 2016:2). If we re-
gard authors of the ESS as true and not strategically duplicitous, it would 
seem that the ESS was not pragmatic at all, especially when we know it 
dubbed Russia as an important international partner that helped form 
stability in the region. It even went as far as to state that "the stability of 
the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict". 
Adhering to principled pragmatism, the EUGS treads more carefully 
before articulating such strong and assertive predictions.
The idea of 'principled pragmatism' accords with Buzan and Weav-
er's argument that "the global level of security at the outset of the twen-
ty-first century can best be understood as one superpower plus four great 
powers." (Buzan & Weaver, 2003:30). As the US still is and, according to 
the data, will be for the foreseeable future the only superpower on Earth, 
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the EU needs to come to terms with its position as a global power. The 
New Strategy is just that, a pragmatic development in the understanding 
of the environment in which the EU finds itself, as well as the facts and 
circumstances of the global security landscape. This does not mean the 
EU needs to resign itself to the present situation, but merely to except 
momentary actuality. As HR/VP Mogherini says, "in challenging times, 
a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts 
together" (EUGS, 2016:3). It needs to think strategically, as it still hasn't 
yet realised its full potential. The EU is a global power as it has economic 
and political potential to bid for superpower status, but lacks a military 
one. What the EU needs is not to reinvent its foreign and security policy, 
but to use the instruments at its disposal. Although it is a global power, 
its security primarily depends on its neighbourhood, since territory still 
is elementary defining feature of security dynamics (Buzan & Weaver, 
2003:30).
The overall flavour of the two strategies is much different, and it have 
as their roots differing situations on the ground. As was noted, the ESS 
was a response to Iraq war troubles. It was a call for unity, and a reminder 
of what happens when Member States go on divergent paths – it treaded 
carefully. The EUGS is a response to the emerging euro-scepticism that 
culminated with Brexit, but it takes unity as given. Although it discloses 
a mere vision of EU security strategy, it calls for and commits to action. 
The different characters of the two strategies show a basic difference in 
the attitudes of their creators. Whereas the ESS is more a panegyric on 
sixty years of European unity in diversity, the EUGS is a spur to action 
that the EU needs. Where the ESS is a fearful attempt of keeping com-
munion, the EUGS is an act of defiance towards sceptics. Where the ESS 
goes on the defence to preserve unity, the EUGS goes on the offense to 
strengthen unity. Even their appeals at the end of papers have different 
flavours. The ESS calls for more active union, while the EUGS calls for 
more credible union. Both documents state that the EU was active in 
foreign and security policy, but what EUGS accurately observes is that 
activity without credibility isn't enough. To be a significant player in 
the international security landscape, the EU needs to be perceived as 
such – it needs to be taken seriously. Accordingly, developed capabilities 
are a necessity, but at some point one needs to use those capabilities to 
show one's pertinence. The last call in both strategies was for a more 
coherent (i.e. more joined-up) union. To achieve this end, however, 
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they use different means. The ESS spends most of it time in describing 
and detailing threats and challenges which lurk in the dark, forgetting 
that not all threats and challenges mean the same to all countries in the 
EU, and nor do different citizens perceive them as equally menacing. 
State failure as a key threat to the EU security sounds unimportant to 
many. When citizens are battling with unemployment and inner insecu-
rity, the failures of Afghanistan, Somalia, and Liberia sound trivial. The 
threat of irregular immigration in Mediterranean sounded irrelevant 
to non-Mediterranean countries, just like the threat from revisionist 
Russia sounds exaggerated to the EU countries that weren't contained 
under the Iron Curtain. To avoid falling into seeming irrelevance, the 
EUGS mentions threats and challenges casually, as agencies that serve 
as an example of obstacles that lie before Member States on the path 
to achieve their shared interests, to their end goals. One of the shared 
interests of the EU Member States is 'peace and security'. Since internal 
and external securities are entwined, obstacles for achieving 'peace and 
security' are all key threats mentioned in the ESS: terrorism, regional 
conflicts, failure of neighbouring states, organised crime, and the threat 
of WMD. The EUGS does not mention these threats but explains that 
aspiration towards 'peace and security' "implies broader interests in pre-
venting conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes 
of instability and working towards a safer world." (EUGS, 2016:14).
As Toje concludes in his critique, "The ESS confirmed the EU as a 
power concerned with maintaining the current international order" 
(Toje, 2010:184). After reviewing the EUGS, we could paraphrase Toje 
and conclude that the EUGS announced the EU as a global power con-
cerned with upgrading the security of international security landscape 
by revising current international order and fostering its own strategic 
autonomy. Revisionism has a negative connotation as it is closely linked 
to Hitler's Germany and today to Russia's new militarism, but to un-
derstand how the EUGS changes the EU's overall direction of foreign 
policy we need to follow Buzan's differentiation between three types of 
revisionism. All three types of revisionism come from its opposition-
al nature towards status quo, but in three different qualities. Orthodox 
revisionism is about power and status, and about feelings of threat; rev-
olutionary revisionism is about power and ideology, and a feeling of 
alienation; radical revisionism is a mixture of both. Radical revisionism 
is not just about self-promotion, and nor is it all for the alteration of the 
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status quo. It opposes the continuation of the status quo by striving to 
reform it, leaving structure as much as possible untouched, but chang-
ing operations. (Buzan, 2009:238-244) The point of this paper is to show 
that through the EUGS, the EU positioned itself as a radical revisionist 
force. This is not unfathomable. The EU has not been seen before. It is 
a unique project that has persisted for sixty years, despite the fact that 
every few years its destruction is declared and predicted. The current 
status of the security landscape is made by and for nation-states, not for 
the Union of 28 (pending 27) states. The Union has different objectives 
to those of a nation-state, regardless of its level of development. For a 
long time, the Union tried to operate under a status quo, and it proved 
difficult. Each Member State had different goals. What connects Mem-
ber States is a shared vision, not particular short-term goals. To achieve 
this shared vision, the EU "will invest in win-win solutions, and move 
beyond the illusion that international politics can be zero-sum game" 
(EUGS, 2016:4.).
6.	Conclusion
This paper proved that with the EUGS the EU positioned itself as effecti-
ve strategic actor. To become such, it needed to define "policy goals and 
the means by which they are to be attained" (Toje, 2010:188). The EUGS 
has done precisely that, codifying the EU's shared interests and end go-
als, and formulating means in the form of priorities and principles by 
which it will fulfil its policy objectives. To achieve the shared interests 
of prosperity, democracy, peace and security, and a rules-based global 
order, the EU will work on implementing a more effective migration 
policy. They intend to continue "working on a more effective common 
European asylum system which upholds right to seek asylum by ensu-
ring the safe, regulated and legal arrival of refugees" (EUGS, 2016:28); 
"through development, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and media-
tion we will work with countries of origin" (EUGS, 2016:27), and they 
hope to "support transit countries by improving reception and asylum 
capacities, and by working on migrants' education, vocational training 
and livelihood opportunities." (EUGS, 2016:27).
One of the criticisms of the ESS and the RI-ESS was that both strat-
egies attempted to conserve the ideology and importance of multilat-
eralism, "rather than positioning the EU in relations to a unipolar or 
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multipolar strategic reality" (Toje, 2010:179). In this regard, the EUGS 
still holds fast. What the EUGS actually does, and what the ESS and the 
RI-ESS failed to do, is position itself contextually in its security strate-
gic reality, its 'neighbourhood'. It also presents a concrete plan of the 
means by which it will achieve its interests. In lieu of developing a grand 
global strategy towards the power-shaped international system, it goes 
on an unpretentious and modest path still clinging to multilateralism 
with the UN as the main global actor; but conceiving, as that the EU is 
the wealthiest and most prosperous part of the Earth, that it should take 
some of the burden of 'global actorship' on itself.
After analysing three documents and taking into account profound 
changes that happened and are still happening in the global security 
landscape, we come to answer our initial question – the ESS is awful-
ly outdated document in changed global security landscape, and the 
EUGS is completely new operational platform.
We can conclude that the framing of the EU foreign and security 
policy finished with this strategy. As this Strategy is alive, is open to-
wards new imputations and changes and is inclined towards upgrades 
and renovation, it can stand for a long time as a cornerstone for the con-
struction of new sub-policies in an ever-changing and increasingly chal-
lenging security landscape. Ultimately it might be best to understand 
the ESS and the RI-ESS as rehearsals before the main performance. Just 
as it was incertitude that preceded the creation of the ESS, incertitude 
preceded the creation of the EUGS. But while the ESS was born timid 
and bashful in the light of unpredictability, the EUGS came out strong, 
defying fear and distrust.
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Članak nudi pregled Globalne strategije Europske unije (EUGS) iz 2016. godine, 
u odnosu na Europsku sigurnosnu strategiju (ESS) iz 2003. Glavni fokus je na 
pronalasku odgovora na pitanje: je li EUGS samo nadogradnja ESS-a ili samo-
stalni dokument. Iako su oba dokumenta nazvana strategijama, prema nekim 
tvrdnjama ESS ne ispunjava uvjete za taj naziv. Usredotočujući se na diskurs 
strategija, članak razmatra njihove sličnosti i razlike te daje pregled njihovih 
struktura unutar definicije pojma strategije. Zaključak je članka da je ESS doku-
ment u suprotnosti sa svojim imenom i da je svoju pravu sigurnosnu strategiju 
Europska unija dobila tek s EUGS-om.
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